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bank charters, controls on interest rates and investments, deposit insurance,
and regular intensive bank inspection.
W. ROBINSON FRAZIER

GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS VERSUS ADMINISTRATIVE
POWER: WHICH IS MORE CONFUSING TO THE ELECTORATE?
In re Executive Assignment of State Attorney, 298 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1974)
An unprecedented administrative order was entered by Chief Justice
Adkins of the Florida supreme court directing the state attorney and the
Leon County grand jury to desist from proceeding further with investigations
of any state, county, or municipal officer who has qualified for reelection'
until the day following the general election. This action was precipitated
by the petition of Governor Askew seeking approval of his continued assignment of the state attorney involved in the grand jury probe. 2 The assignment
and investigations were postponed by Chief Justice Adkins, who acted
under his authority as "chief administrative officer of the judicial system," in
I. Further investigations of any citizen who had qualified for election were also
precluded. 298 So. 2d 382, 386 (Fla. 1974).
2. FLA. STAT. §27.14 (1973) grants the Governor the power to assign a state attorney
to other circuits in the state. Any assignment in excess of sixty days in one calendar year
must be approved by order of the supreme court, upon application of the Governor
showing good and sufficient cause to extend such exchange or assignment. The purpose
of the time limitation is to prevent the chief executive from frustrating the will of the
voters of a judicial circuit by replacing any elected state attorney with one from another
circuit. Finch v. Fitzpatrick, 254 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 1971).
State Attorney Austin's original assignment by Governor Askew was made pursuant
to a resolution of the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee requesting that a state
attorney be assigned to carry forward its investigation relating to certain allegations
concerning Floyd T. Christian, Exec. Order No. 74-19 (March 4, 1974), amended, Exec.
Order No. 74-24 (April 19, 1974), to include investigation of all matters resulting from
the inquiry pertaining to Christian. The order did not mention specific persons or matters
that were to be investigated. The assignment was extended for ninety days upon the request of the grand jury, through Circuit Judge Rudd, and the elected state attorney.
Exec. Order No. 74-25 (April 25, 1974), approved, Fla. Sup. Ct. (April 26, 1974). The
assignment in the instant opinion was for an additional 120 days. Again, the request was
made by the grand jury, through Circuit Judge Rudd, and by the elected state attorneN
who still did not have the staff necessary to continue the investigation himself. Exec. Order
No. 74-36 (July 23, 1974).
Attorney General Shevin filed a motion for a review of Chief Justice Adkins' original
order before the full supreme court. The order was to suspend grand jury investigations
for 104 days.
3. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §2(b) provides: "The chief justice of the supreme court shall
be chosen by a majority of the members of the court. He shall be the chief administrative
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order to protect the rights of the people to weigh campaign presentations
and elect their officials in a calm and objective atmosphere.4 The Florida
supreme court approved a revised and clarified version of the order in a
4-3 decision. 5 Although Chief Justice Alkins later rescinded his order, the
Florida supreme court HELD, that the chief justice had the authority to
issue an administrative order enjoining a grand jury investigation and that
absent the necessary showing 6 such an injunction may be enforced.
The modern grand jury7 has been the subject of much controversy. It
has been viewed as merely a rubber stamp for the district attorney8 and has

officer of the judicial system. He shall have the power to assign justices or judges, including
consenting retired justices or judges, to temporary duty in any court for which the
judge is qualified and to delegate to a chief judge of a judicial circuit the power to
assign judges for duty in his respective circuit." (Emphasis added.)
4. FLA. CoNsr. art. VI, §5: "General and special elections - A general election shall
be held in each county on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each
even-numbered year to choose a successor to each elective state and county officer whose
term will expire before the next general election and, except as provided herein, to fill
each vacancy in elective office for the unexpired portion of the term. Special election and
referenda shall be held as provided by law." Compare this language with the interpretation
that this section was intended as a recognition and protection of such rights. 298 So. 2d
at 384-85.
5. 298 So. 2d 382. Chief Justice Adkins and Justices Roberts, McCain, and Deckle
concurred in the per curiam opinion; Justices Ervin, Boyd, and Overton dissented. Governor
Askew, Attorney General Shevin, and State Attorney Austin filed an application for stay in
the Supreme Court of the United States. Askew v. Supreme Ct., No. A-41 (U.S. Sup. Ct.
filed Aug. 6, 1974). The application for stay of the revised order was withdrawn on Aug.
8, 1974. The Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives asked the Judiciary Committee whether a special session of the Florida Legislature could repeal the order. Jeff
Gautier, chairman of the committee, concluded that a special session would be inadvisable.
Letter from Jeff Gautier, Chairman of Comm. on Judiciary, to Honorable T. T. Sessums,
Speaker of House of Rep., Aug. 6, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Letter].
6. Chief Justice Adkins was notified that the statute of limitations might run on
certain investigations. The grand jury also assured him that there would be a prompt
disposition of pending matters. Public interest and possible harm to individuals involved
in the probe were also instrumental in the decision to rescind the order. 298 So. 2d at
389. See text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
These facts had been brought to the attention of the chief justice by the grand jury
presentment of Aug. 6, 1974 (filed by Fla. supreme court clerk under Case No. 45,928)
[hereinafter cited as Presentment]. The presentment constituted the necessary showing
referred to in the revised order: "[A]ny grand jury investigation of a candidate may be
conducted if a showing can be made to the Chief Justice or this Court that the public
welfare requires such investigation or that law enforcement would be hampered by the
brief recess provided for in this administrative order. The Chief Justice will give full
consideration to the showing made and carefully consider the application for approval
of the investigation." 298 So. 2d at 386-87.
7. For insight into history of the grand jury, see Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 789-92
(D.C. Cir. 1973); In re Report of Grand jury, 152 Fla. 154, 156-58, 11 So. 2d 316, 317-18
(1942); Braun, The Grand Jury- Spirit of the Community?, 15 ARIZ. L. Riv. 893, 894-95
(1973).
8. 8 J. MooRa, F. mtAL PRACCE 6.02(la) at 6-9 (2d ed. 1974); Comment, Florida
Grand Jury, 8 U. MIAMi L.Q. 584, 592 (1954).
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been criticized 9 as being cumbersome, slow, inefficient, and costly.' 0 Consequently, a few states have abolished the grand jury." On the other hand,
staunch defenders of the system label it one of the bulwarks of liberty, a
protector of the innocent, and the people's weapon for preventing abusive
2
practices by public officials.'
In Florida the grand jury system has been held in high esteem and has
been considered an invaluable adjunct to the judiciary and to state enforcement of criminal law. 3 The supreme court has emphasized that courts are
without power to interfere with the grand jury so long as it acts within
reasonable bounds in performing its functions.' 4 Because the grand jury is
"of the people and for the people,"15 the court may not restrict investigation
of any matter into which a grand jury is by law entitled to inquire.'0
Supervisory power over Florida's local and statewide 7 grand juries is
vested in the circuit judge.-8 Recognizing that grand jury investigations
9. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury, Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153
(1965); Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency
of the Prosecutor?, 2 N.M.L. REv. 141 (1972).
10. Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OF-E. L. REV. 101 (1931).
11. In Michigan and Connecticut the trial judge is authorized to conduct in canera
investigations into crime and make his own determination of probable cause. See generally
Winters, The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 28 J. A.M. Jun. Soc'v 137 (1945); Comment,
Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge and Undue Influence, 39 U.
CHi. L. REv. 761, 781 n.117 (1972).
12. Morse, supra note 10; C omment, supra note 8.
13. Kanner & Smith, The Florida Jury Process, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1962).
14. Ryon v. Shaw, 77 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1955).
15. Clemmons v. State, 141 So. 2d 749, 753 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962), modified. 150 So. 2d
231 (Fla. 1963).
16. FLA. STAT. §905.18 (1973). It is the grand jur)'s duty to inquire into every offense
triable within the county. FLA. STAT. §905.16 (1973). A grand jury may investigate ever)
offense that affected the health, sanitation, and general welfare of the county institutions,
buildings, offices and officers and make due presentment concerning their physical, sanitar).
and general condition. Owens v. State, 59 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1952).
17. FLA. STAT. §§905.31-40 (1973) provide for a statewide grand jury that investigates
matters that transpire or have significance in more than one count)'. The Governor petitions
the supreme court for an order impaneling a statewide grand jury. FLA. STAT. §905.33(1)
(1973). The supreme court may determine from the facts in the Governor's petition that
the investigation could operate more appropriately in a particular region. If so, the
supreme court may specify from which designated judicial circuit prospective jurors will
be selected. FLA. STAT. §905.33 (1973). Judicial supervision of the statewide grand jury
is maintained by the presiding judge. FLA. STAT. §905.39 (1973). The chief justice designates
a circuit court judge to preside over the statewide grand jury. FLA. STAT. §905.33(2) (1973).
The supreme court considers its duties concerning statewide grand juries to be ministerial,
because these duties involve no judgment relative to any potential defendants or to any
acts alleged to have occurred. Thus, the requisite impartiality of the court is insured
for appellate review. In re Advisory Opinion, 290 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1974) (ministerial
acts involve no exercise of discretion); First Nat'l Bank v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 534, 145 So. 204,
207 (1933). The approval of the Governor's executive assignment of a state attorney was
also considered a ministerial duty. In re Advisory Opinion, 290 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1974).
The instant order appears to be a retraction of this opinion.
18. An inferior court, such as the Criminal Court of Record, has no authority to summon
and impanel a grand jury and can be restrained by a writ of prohibition from usurping
the circuit court's jurisdiction. State ex rel. Gerstein v. Baker, 243 So. 2d 464 (3d D.C.A.
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should be conducted by those having intimate knowledge of local conditions, 9
legislative enactments and judicial interpretations have granted the circuit
judge broad powers over the grand jury. The circuit judge may, in his discretion, dispense with convening a grand jury, 20 extend its term, 21 or recall it
after dismissal. 22 Additionally, when the circuit judge deems it impractical
to convene a grand jury in the county where the crime was committed, he
may refer the matter to any other grand jury. 22 He may also dispense with
the traditional rule of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings and require certain disclosures.24
Traditionally, the Florida supreme court has not assumed a supervisory
role over grand juries. More specifically, the court's role concerning grand
juries has been to rule on the constitutionality of statutes concerning the
grand jury, 25 to interpret the investigative powers of the grand jury,26 and
to decide whether the grand jury exceeded its authority by including matters
in its report that should be expunged from the record.27 In such cases the
supreme court was involved either because of its appellate jurisdiction2s or
because of its power to issue constitutional writs.29 Additionally, the supreme
court has exercised its rulemaking power to designate which crimes may be

Fla. 1971).
In New Jersey an assignment judge has the exclusive power to supervise and dismiss
the grand jury. His actions are subject to reversal only when he abuses his discretion.
Del Tufo, A Study in Judicial Administration: The Assignment Judge in New Jersey, 15
RUTGERs L. Rav. 179, 181-84 (1961).
In the federal system the district court judge assumes this role. The federal district
judge has the authority to convene or discharge a grand jury at any time and for any
reason. The exercise of this authority is not reviewable by a court of appeals in the
absence of a flagrant abuse of discretion. Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 933 (7th
Cir. 1973); In re Investigation of World Arrangement with Relation to Production, etc., of
Petroleum, 107 F. Supp. 628, 629 (D.D.C. 1952). Fa. R. CaUM. P. 6(g).
19. Higginbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26, 28, 101 So. 233, 234 (1924) (relative to power
to transfer matters to other grand juries, FLA. STAT. §905.21 (1973)).
20.

21.
22.
23.

FLA. STAT. §905.01(2) (1973).
FLA. STAT. §905.095 (1973).
FLA. STAT. §905.09 (1973).
FLA. STAT. §905_21 (1973).

24. Traditionally, grand jury proceedings are secret. The purposes ascribed to this rule
are: to protect the jurors, to promote a complete freedom of disclosure, to prevent an
indicted person from escaping before he can be arrested, to prevent subornation of perjury
aimed at disproving facts there testified to, and to protect reputations of persons against
whom no indictment is found. When essential to the administration of justice, the court
may dispense with this rule and require disclosure. See also Note, Discovery in Criminal
Proceedings, 13 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 242 (1960).
25. State ex rel. Ashmann v. Williams, 151 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1963).
26. Owens v. State, 59 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1952); see Comment, Grand jury: Scope of Report,
6 U. FLA. L. Rltv. 140 (1953).
27. State ex rel. Brautigam v. Interim Report of Grand Jury, 93 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1957).
28. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §§3(b)(2)-(3).
29. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, §3(b)(4) provides that the supreme court "[m]ay issue writs
of prohibition to courts and commissions in causes within the jurisdiction of the supreme
court to review, and all writs necessary .to. the- complete exercise of its jurisdiction."
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presented by grand jury indictments.3° But the Florida supreme court has
never before concerned itself with whether a grand jury should be in session.
Nor has the chief justice ever exercised the administrative power granted
him by the 1968 Florida Constitution- until now. The instant case represents
a culmination of events in which the new administrative power was exercised
to accomplish the unprecedented result of restraining a grand jury.
30. FLA. R. CRItN. P. 3.140(g). The supreme court has the power to adopt rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts, including the administrative supersision of all
courts. These rules are subject to legislative repeal. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §2(a). "The entire
area of substance and procedure may be described as a 'twilight zone' and a statute or
rule will be characterized as substantive or procedural according to the nature of the
problem for which a characterization must be made . . . . As to the term 'procedure,'
I conceive it to include the administration of remedies available in cases of invasion of
primary rights of individuals. The term 'rules of practice and procedure' includes all
rules governing the parties, their counsel and the Court throughout the progress of the
case from the time of its initiation until final judgment and its execution." In re Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J., concurring opinion).
See Note. The Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone
Between Substance and Procedure, 24 U. FLA. L. Rav. 87 (1971) (written before the
Florida constitution was amended to give the legislature power to repeal such rules).
The legislature has the constitutional right to repeal any rule of the supreme court
by a two-thirds vote. It has no constitutional authority to enact any law relating to
practice and procedure, nor can it amend or supersede a rule by an act of the legislature.
FLA. CO ST. art. V, §2(a). In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure
(FLA. CONST. art. V, §2(a)), 281 So. 2d 204, 205 (Fla. 1973).
31. See note 3 supra. Previously, the supreme court had shown an unwillingness to
exercise the newly conferred power to administer the court system for the expedition
of litigation and settlement of jurisdictional questions among the state courts. State
ex rel. Shevin v. Eastmoore, 286 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J., dissenting opinion).
One problem concerning the power is that court administration is mentioned in two
parts of the Florida constitution. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §§ 2(b), 3. The presumption thus
arises that two separate powers exist. One is the chief justice's power to issue administratihe
orders. The other is the court's power to promulgate procedural rules.
The supreme court has seen fit to issue some rules concerning court administration.
The chief judge of the circuit court is responsible for the administrative supervision of
the circuit and county courts in his circuit. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §2(d). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.020
specifies his powers and duties. In the instant case the supreme court could have promulgated a similar procedural rule defining the chief justice's administrative powers. The
court could have ruled that the chief justice had the authority to oversee all judicial
proceedings, including grand jury investigations and to suspend such grand jury proceedings
when justice required. If the legislature disapproved such a rule, it could have voted its
repeal.
The House Judiciary Committee considers the general policy in the order to be a
rule of procedure that it would like the legislature to repeal. Proposed Bill Relating
to FLA. CONST. art. V, §2 by House Comm. on Judiciary, No. 186-14-9-4 (Preliminary
Draft). But the instant case purports to be an administrative order. It could also be termed
a writ essential to the exercise of its jurisdiction, for the court has been consistently increasing its jurisdiction tinder the "all writs" provision. See Monroe Educ. Ass'n v. Clerk,
299 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1974) (Justice Ervin emphasized that the issuance of a constitutional
writ is not dependent upon or altogether ancillary to independent appellate proceedings);
Couse v. Canal Authority, 209 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1968) ("all writs" provision used to broaden
certiorari jurisdiction). It appears that the administrative power has created a new
"twilight zone" between substance and procedure in which the respective roles of the
legislature and the court are subject to controversy.
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The original order suspended all grand jury investigations. 32 State Attorney Austin's assignment to the Second Judicial Circuit and to the Leon
County grand jury proceedings were both deferred until the day after the
election. There was, however, one exception; Austin was still authorized to
participate in any criminal proceedings that had already been set for trial.
Additionally, the order provided that if Austin could show that a stay of the
proceedings would cause the statute of limitations to run against matters
under investigation, Chief Justice Adkins would reconsider the order with
respect to such investigations. Although the order was specifically directed to
State Attorney Austin and the Leon County grand jury, it was declared to
be a general policy for operation throughout the state of Florida.33
The original order was predicated upon Chief Justice Adkins' belief that
certain investigations had been conducted to coincide with campaigns and
elections. 34 He also believed that unlawful leaks from the grand jury and
the issuance of subpoenas had resulted in distorted news stories3 5 and thus had
confused the electorate and interfered with the right of the legislative and
executive branches to manage the election process. Because campaigns could
not proceed in a calm and objective manner due to grand jury investigations,
Chief Justice Adkins felt compelled to stop the proceedings. The media re-

32. Order defining Action on Request for Second Extension of Assignment of a State
Attorney & Continuing Grand Jury Investigations of Certain Matters, Case No. 45,928 (July

25, 1974).
33. 298 So. 2d at 387. Attorney General Shevin concluded that at least four grand
jury investigations involving candidates would be impeded due to the general policy outlined in the order. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, July 31, 1974, §B at 1, col. 6. It also
seemed conclusive that the order precluded grand jury investigations of a candidate charged
with murder, robbery, or rape and investigations of alleged election law violations. St.
Petersburg (Fla.) Times, July 26, 1974, §A at 12, col. 1. See FLA. STAT. §104.43 (1973).
34. Compare 298 So. 2d at 385: "[I]n some areas . . .grand juries and their attending
legal advisors have elected to conduct investigations of the conduct of certain incumbent
public officials and other citizens who have qualified for election to office during the
campaign season," with the fact that the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee conducted
an investigation concerning Floyd T. Christian, Comm'r of the Dep't of Education, for
an entire year prior to its Feb. 27, 1974, request that a state attorney be assigned to
carry forward its investigations. The present grand jury proceedings resulted from these
investigations. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, July 27, 1974, §B at 11, col. 2. See note 2
supra. See also St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, July 26, 1974, §A at 12, col. 1:
"But, in an interview, Adkins backed off his written order, insisting he didn't say the
investigations 'were deliberately being held back.
" 'I don't think Ed Austin intended in any way to affect any election,' Adkins said. 'The
only delay was caused by the inability of the grand jury to secure the records.' "
35. "The press and news media, being to a large degree unbridled in the publication
of news, continue to pour out news stories concerning such investigations which feed
the rumor mills, reach the public sometimes distorted, and tend to confuse the
electorate . . .." 298 So. 2d at 385.
"Though none of Askew's executive orders had specified that it is O'Malley the jurors
are investigating, he [Adkins] said, 'Every time I turn on my television or radio or pick
up a newspaper, I see they are.' " St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, July 31, 1974, §B at 4, col. 1.
To this Shevin answered that subpoenas are public record and witnesses cannot be hidden,
and that if there were leaks those who made them should be punished, not the public. Id.
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torted that it might have been better to suspend the election rather than
the legal process.36
The original order was criticized,3 7 revised, and subsequently clarified by
Chief Justice Adkins.38 ie revised the order to allow the grand jury to investigate crimes of violence 3 9 and matters where delay would result in the
expiration of the statute of limitations. 40 He also stated that he would reconsider his order if "law enforcement" and the "general welfare" would
suffer by the brief recess.'- The effect of the original order was clarified so
that the power of the state attorney to prosecute by information would re2

main unimpaired.4

Upon motion by the Florida attorney general, the supreme court reviewed
the administrative order and approved the revised version. 43 Implicit in the
court's reasoning was that the chief justice is the chief administrative officer
of the judicial system and the grand jury is part of that system; therefore,
the administrative order was within the authority of the chief justice. 44 Because a grand jury has never before been enjoined for these reasons, 45 the
36. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Aug. 4, 1974, §D at 2, col. 1. The editorial also
stated: "[Tjhe First Amendment, which guarantees a free press, is also effectively circumvented by the Adkins edict. It cuts off news for the press to print and for )ou to read,
and Adkins made it clear this was a prime purpose of his action." This way "we can all
vote in ignorance . . . 'in a calm and objective manner.' " Id. col. 1.
37. For instance, one newspaper editorial labeled "Abuse of Power" stated: "[The]
unprecedented irregular and erratic attempt last week to suspend a grand jury investigation
of Insurance Commissioner Tom O'Malley raises serious questions about Adkins' suitability
for the state's highest court." St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, July 28, 1974, §D at 2, col. 1.
The per curiam opinion noted: "Adverse reaction and criticism resulted from an apparent
misunderstanding of the order bringing hostile denunciation of the court from persons
not familiar with its contents .... " 298 So. 2d at 383.
38. 298 So. 2d at 384.
39. See note 33 supra.
40. The original order stated that consideration would be given to lifting the effect
of the order as to such investigations; whereas, the revised order stated that the order
would not apply to such investigations.
41. See note 6 supra.
42. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. I, §15(1) grants the grand jury and the
prosecuting attorney concurrent authority to file a formal accusation of the commission
of a felony, not involving a capital crime, by indictment or information, respectively. State
ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1972). This dual method of initiating
criminal proceedings is preferred to the indictment method alone, especially for investigations
of political fraud and corruption in local government. See Morse, supra note 10, at 363-64.
Austin thought the decision represented "an encroachment upon or erosion of the prosecutorial function." St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Aug. 2, 1974, §B at 3, col. 4.
43. 298 So. 2d 384.
44. Id. at 385. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Cobo), 287 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. 1973).
A witness summoned before a grand jury to testify concerning wiretap interceptions is
an aggrieved party involved in a judicial "proceeding in or before any court."
45. A federal grand jury was restrained from conducting investigations because the
dominant purpose of the investigation was to enable the government to procure testimony
to be used in a trial under a separate indictment. Subpoenas were also quashed. The
grand jury was restrained until the government had tried the defendants on the New
York indictment or had proved to the court that they intended to try the defendants
upon any new indictment obtained.
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most significant issue46 before the court should have been the power of the
chief justice to stay grand jury proceedings. Instead of exploring this question in depth, however, the court seemingly assumed the existence of this
power and emphasized the peripheral issue of whether there were facts
supporting the exercise of the power. Of significance to the court was the
belief that the grand jury had been in recess for 115 out of 150 days17 and
that State Attorney Austin had assured the chief justice that the delay would
4
'
not endanger the ultimate result of any matter under investigation.
In discussing grand juries, the majority emphasized that a grand jury is
subject to reasonable corrective measures when it transcends bounds of law
The court held that it has a supervisory duty over grand juries based on its inherent
power- to prevent abuse of its processes (subpoenas). In re National Window Glass Workers,
287 F. 219 (N.D, Ohio 1922).. Even though the judge has this duty, there should be
no curtailment of the inquisitorial -power of the grand jury except in the clearest cases
of abuse. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 238 F.2d 713, 722 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 852 U.S. 981 (1957).
Also, many grand juries- have- been dismissed. In a nationally famous incident, District
Judge Geiger dismissed a -federal grand jury before it could return an indictment. He
discovered that the-Department of Justice had used confidentiaL testimony given- before
the grand jury in an effort to obtain "consent decrees" from a group of automobile finance
companies. The companies were under investigation for alleged violations of the antitrust
laws. The companies had been told that the grand jury was preparing indictments
against them, but that they would not be indicted if they would sign the agreements.
Judge Geiger considered this conduct improper and grounds for dismissal of the grand
jury. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1937, at 4, col. 4. See also United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283,
292 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
46. Another issue was the failure of the court to approve the continuation of the
special assignment of the state attorney, pursuant to FLA. STAT. §27.14 -(1978). See note 2
supra. This was not the issue of consequence, however, because this action would not
terminate the grand jury proceedings. The Governor could always appoint another state

attorney or direct the local state attorney to take charge. 298 So. 2d .at 288. (Overton, J.,
dissenting).

The purpose of FLA. STAT. §27.14 (1973) is to serve as a buffer in case a .state attorney
does not want to be. transferred against his will, according to .Attorney General. Skevin.
St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, July 81, 1974, §B at 4, col. 2..Iii the. instant case, State Attorney Austin had joined in the request for the extension. Exec. Order No. 74-36 (July
23, 1974).
To prevent such court control, the Speaker of the House' of Representatives suggested
that the legislature could repeal FLA. STAT. §27.14 or modify it to give the court control
only when the reassigned state attorney objects to a gubernatorial mission. St. Petersburg
(Fla.) Times, Aug. 5, 1974, §B at 10, col. 1. In the alternative, FLA. STAT. §27.14 could be
amended to provide that the Governor may assign a state attorney for a period greater
than sixty days only if the state attorney approved the transfer. Letter, supra note 5.
The court noted that during the state attorney's assignment there had been a sharp
increase in crimes and violence in Jacksonville. Austin is the state attorney for the
-Fourth Judicial Circuit, which includesJacksonville. 298 So. 2d at 383. While Austin was in
Jacksonville, having returned because of the original order, his daughter's 10-speed
bicycle was stolen from their home. He agreed with the supreme court that there had
been an increase in crime, but stated: "I think it stays constant whether I'm here or
not." St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Aug. 1, 1974, §B at 13, col. 6.
47. The court was mistaken in this fact. See text accompanying note 60 infra.
48. Nevertheless, Austin believed he could not voluntarily defer these investigations.
298 So. 2d at 386. This fact was corrected also. See text accompanying note 61 infra.
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and reason. 49 Therefore, the court infers that one of these corrective measures
could be the temporary suspension of grand jury proceedings. Nevertheless,
the holding purports to be limited to its facts ° and thus the scope of the
majority opinion holding is somewhat unclear. The per curiam opinion did
not address Chief Justice Adkins' interpretation of the Florida constitution
and his fair elections concept, nor did it attempt to define the administrative
power of the chief justice and the ramifications of the exercise of that power.5 '
The scope of the administrative power was, however, the subject of Justice
Overton's dissenting opinion. He interpreted the administrative authority
of the chief justice to encompass the "inherent authority to do everything
necessary to insure a full, fair and expeditious trial of all matters in the court
system." 5 2 But he did not think that under these particular facts the manner
in which a particular court proceeding could affect candidates for election
was within the purview of this authority. He believed that the chief justice
could terminate grand jury proceedings concerning candidates for office only
upon a showing of illegality or improper conduct in a particular case.5 3 Or

as dissenting Justice Boyd succintly said: "Courts should not interfere with
grand jury probes without proof of unlawful abuse of discretion."' ' Justice
49. "Conceivably, a grand jury report could be so salicious [sic] or scurrilous or defamatory or so lacking in truth as to indicate a malicious exploitation of authority. When
this is apparent, punishment for contempt might be justified." 298 So. 2d at 384, quoting
State v. Clemmons, 150 So. 2d 231, 234 (Fla. 1963), modifying 141 So. 2d 749 (1st D.C.A.
Fa. 1962).
50. The court merely concluded that the revised and clarified order was within
the orbit of the constitutional authority granted the chief justice. In approving the order,
the court stated that the public interest and general welfare of Florida and law enforcement generally suffered no injury by the order. 298 So. 2d at 384. Whether the court
would have found the order beyond the authority of the chief justice had such injul)
been suffered or whether the court would have found it within his authority but tinacceptable on such facts is not clear.
51. The order presented several unanswered questions, such as: Who was to refile
the bribery charge against former education commissioner Flo)d T. Christian that had
been dismissed on a technicalit)? Adkins informed a newspaper that Austin could file an
information. Additionally, who was to prosecute the perjury indictment against architect
Walter Melody (charging that he lied to the grand jury in Christian's behalf) that had
not yet been set for trial? The order permitted Austin to participate in criminal proceedings that had already been set for trial. Also, which prosecutor would help the
grand jury indict anyone who might otherwise escape prosecution tinder the statute
of limitations? St. Petersburg (FIa.) Times, Aug. 2, 1974, §B, at 3, col. 1. Normally, the
grand jury requests the circuit court to advise them of their legal duties. FLA. SlAT. §905.18
(1973). Under these exceptional circumstances, where orders come from the chief justice
rather than from the presiding judge, it is unclear if the grand jury must petition the
chief justice. A final issue remaining unclear is whether the constitution does recognilc
the right of the people to enjoy a calm and objective campaign and election, and, if so,
whether a suspension of grand jury investigations and the resulting absence of news
concerning them insures a fair and just campaign.

52. 298 So. 2d at 388.
53. Id. The opinion does not specify whose improper conduct is contemplated.
54. Id. Justice Boyd considered this order to be a denial of equal protection. it
granted immunity from investigation and indictment to political candidates but not to
other persons. But see Sweeney v. Balkcom, 358 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1966).
Justice Boyd also disfavored restricting investigations of judicial misconduct by the
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Overton suggests that the court should use its power to expedite grand jury
proceedings rather than to stay them. He considered the revised order to
have been more a hindrance than a help to candidates.
The role of the chief justice with respect to the administrative power is
discussed by Justice Ervin in his dissent.5 5 In his opinion, the chief justice
has the duty and responsibility to take the lead on behalf of the court's administrative problems. The chief justice also serves as the court's liaison with
the executive and legislative branches. Initially, the chief justice is free to
act for the court and his authority remains unimpaired. But the chief justice's
orders are always subject to review and modification by the other members
,of the court. Thus, the court serves as a check and balance on his administrative power.
In the instant case Justice Ervin would have modified the general policy
in the order by shifting the burden of proof to the aggrieved person to show
that a particular investigation was preventing a fair campaign and election
for him.56 Accordingly, the grand jury's broad power of investigation must
remain unrestricted and its historic independence preserved until the grand
jury violates the rights of an aggrieved individual. In a related hearing,
Thomas D. O'Malley petitioned the court as such an aggrieved person. He
thought that a cloud of suspicion surrounded him because of the activities
of the Leon County grand jury. In order to eliminate this cloud, O'Malley
petitioned the court to order State Attorney Austin either to indict him or
to report a no true bill.s7 The court refused this particular request, however,
on the same day it affirmed the revised order.58 Consequently, before investigations of candidates could continue during the campaign, State Attorney
Austin was required to show that the particular investigation was essential
to the public welfare and to law enforcement.
The Leon County grand jury, not the state attorney, made the necessary
showing 9 that led to rescission of the order by correcting the mistaken
Judicial Qualifications Commission. He remarked: "Those who cannot stand the bright
light of public scrutiny should not hold judicial offices." State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295
So. 2d 609, 626 (Fla. 1974) (Boyd, J., dissenting).
55. 298 So. 2d at 387. On another occasion Justice Ervin concluded: "This Court
should not precipitously and prematurely intrude in a particular disciplinary case to
restrain in advance an investigation of a judge [by the Judicial Qualifications Commission]."
State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, 624 (Fla. 1974) (Ervin, J., dissenting).
56. 298 So. 2d at 387.
57. A no true bill indicates that the grand jury has refused to indict because it
believes the prosecutor's case is probably too weak to go to trial. Comment, supra note 11,
at 766 n.31.
58. The court denied this part of his request, but granted his motion for leave to
intervene and participate in the instant proceedings. Order on Petition -for Leave To
Intervene and for Partial Modification in re: Thomas D. O'Malley, Case No. 45,928 (July
31, 1974).
59. Pertinent parts in Presentment, note 6 supra, stated: "It is our belief that this
body which knows the evidence should be the one to decide when an investigation should
be in recess or terminated. History informs us and our experience confirms, that the
wheels of justice grind slowly but they grind exceedingly small.
"This grand jury has partially investigated a case which, if completed, could remove
clouds of doubt or could cause indictments.
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facts upon which the original and revised orders were based. The presentment pointed out that the grand jury had been impaneled only twenty-five
days when it concluded that an extension of the state attorney's assignment
was necessary; therefore, the panel could not have been in recess for 115
days. 60 The grand jury emphasized that the delay would prevent it from
completing the investigation in a timely manner and could cause some prosecutions to be barred by the statute of limitations. 61 As to the accusations
concerning unlawful leaks, the grand jury responded that to the best of its
knowledge no member had violated his oath by leaking information to anyone.

62

Chief Justice Adkins rescinded his order in light of these facts.6 3 He relied
upon grand jury assurances that the investigations would proceed with due
haste and without political interference. The true basis of his decision, however, is difficult to determine. The grand jury presentment and the application for stay of the order to the Supreme Court of the United States64 may
have been instrumental. Whether discussions of a special legislative session
to repeal the order, talk of possible impeachment, or suggestions that the
Judicial Qualifications Commission review the affirming supreme court
justices had any effect on the decision to rescind is pure speculation.
The instant ruling is only one example of the increasing power of individual justices and of the court as a whole. The court has stated that
the limitations on the supreme court's jurisdiction do not restrict the capacity
of a justice to act as a judicial officer of the state. According to the court,
the justices and the court are not granted their power by the state constitu"We are sympathetic with the candidates who must seek public office while under
grand jury investigation, but we believe that the public has the good sense to distinguish
between an investigation, an indictment, and a trial to determine the innocence or guilt
of an accused. Further, it is our firm belief that our responsibility is to base our decision
on justice and not on sympathy.
"This body has always and continues to be unanimous in our desire to continue the
investigations before us and to complete them as soon as possible. We again request that
the same visiting state attorney . . . be permitted to return to Leon County to continue
these investigations."
60. Id.; see text accompanying note 47 supra.
61. Id.; see text accompanying note 48 supra.
62. Id.; see text accompanying note 35 supra. Austin had commented that he was proud
there had been no unlawful leaks of confidential information presented to the grand jury
and that this was substantiated by the fact that most of the grand jury's information had
never been reported. News stories had focused generally on witnesses and documents subpoenaed by the grand jury, which are matters of public record, and a $40,000 lobbying fund
that had been the subject of previous investigations by two other state attorneys. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, July 31, 1974, §B at 4, col. 3.
63. 298 So. 2d at 389. "The presentment also appears to satisfy the earlier demands
of Intervenor herein for an immediate disposition of any charge, one way or the other."
See note 58 supra.
O'Malley was indicted for accepting unauthorized compensation and for perjury before
a grand jury. Indictments No. 74-724, 74-725 (Oct. 18, 1974). Despite this, he was reelected
as state treasurer on Nov. 5, 1974, by 52% of the vote. Gainesville, (Fla.) Sun, Nov. 6. 1974,
§A at 6, col. 3.
64. See note 5 supra.
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tion-the constitution is merely a limitation on their power.65 This interpretation has facilitated the increased power of individual justices in areas in
which the constitution does not specifically limit them. Also, the supreme
court has consistently enlarged the scope of its own jurisdiction through its
rulemaking power and through broad interpretation of its power to grant
"all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction."' 66
In an opinion paralleling the case at bar, the court seriously restricted
the power of the Judicial Qualifications Commission 67 to investigate a
particular judge.68 In the instant case the chief justice seriously restricted
the investigations of candidates and the supreme court approved. In each
case, the restriction appeared to be limited to the unique set of facts presented.69 Nonetheless, the court set precedents by intruding into the constitutional and statutory functions of the commission and the grand jury, respectively,
without awaiting the recommendations or findings of either proceeding. ° By
these premature intrusions, the supreme court has exhibited an extreme
willingness to assume an active role in policing its "judicial appendages,"
such as the Judicial Qualifications Commission 7i and the grand jury.
The grand jury seems to be viewed by Chief Justice Adkins as an impediment to orderly operation of other branches of the government. The
instant decision is very disparaging to this common law institution. By statute,
a judge is prohibited from restricting the grand jury's investigation of any

65. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Lee, 274 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1973). FLA. CONSr. art. V, §19 (art.
V, §25 (1885)) provides that all judicial officers, including supreme court justices, shall be
conservators of the peace. As such, they are vested with the power and authority given to
committing magistrates. Because committing magistrates can permit interception of wire
and oral communications, and because the constitution does not preclude a justice from
issuing such orders, it follows that justices have the power to do so.
66. The "all writs" power is found in FLA. CONST. art. V, §3(b)(4). See notes 29, 31
supra. State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, 611-12 (Fla. 1974).
67. The Judicial Qualifications Commission is an arm of the supreme court. FLA.
CONsr. art. V, §12(f) provides: "Upon recommendation of two-thirds of the members of
the judicial qualifications commission, the supreme court may order that the justice
or judge be disciplined . . . or be removed from office . . . for willful or persistent failure
to perform his duties or for other conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary ......
68. The court said the final decision to reprimand or remove a justice or judge rests
with the supreme court. State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 1974).
69. The commission was investigating alleged acts that occurred while Judge Turner
was a judge of the Criminal Court of Record, an office not within the jurisdiction of the
commission. This particular problem of jurisdiction could not arise again because the
Criminal Court of Record was abolished and all remaining courts are within the commission's jurisdiction. The court stated that the commission has the right to investigate
matters occuring within a reasonable time of the alleged act of misconduct. Significantly,
the court stated as a matter of public policy that two years is a reasonable time. State
ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d at 612-13, 618.
70. Id. at 620 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
71. The Florida supreme court no longer has the power to adopt rules regulating the
procedure of this commission. Instead, the commission adopts its own rules, which are subject to repeal by a majority vote of the membership of each house or by the supreme
court (five justices concurring). FLA. CONSr. art. V, §12(d), amending FLA. CONST. art. V,
§12(c) (1973).
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matter triable in the county.7 2 But the court never considered this statute.
and the chief justice accomplished this same result by issuing an administrative order. When the Leon County grand jury was sworn in, Circuit Judge
Rudd pointed out that the grand jury "was considered a safeguard of the
liberties of the people against encroachments and oppressions of political
power and against unfounded accusations prompted by public malice, personal animosity or other improper motives." 3 Ironically, Chief Justice Adkins
believed that the grand jury was not an effective safeguard, because its
investigations were motivated by political reasons, were confusing to the
electorate, and were unfair to the candidates.7
If the grand jury is no longer invaluable to the judiciary, then the legislature should abolish it. If the supreme court is to be empowered to restrict
grand jury investigations, then the legislature should amend the statutes accordingly. 5 Until then, judicial supervision of grand juries should remain in
the hands of the presiding circuit judge, who has the knowledge and the
statutory power to control it. The legislature should clarify the breadth of
the court's administrative power, and the supreme court establish rules for
the exercise and review of this power. 76 In that way, any confusion and potential abuse concerning the exercise of the power will be minimized.
DONNA LITMAN

MAINES

72. FLA. STAT. §§905.16, .18 (1973). See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
73. Address by Circuit Judge Rudd to Leon County grand jury, Aug. 5, 1974, on file
in the office of the University of Florida Law Review. Judge Rudd also told the grand
jury: "I remarked to you when you were empaneled that you were being called to serve
on what could be a very historical grand jury. This is true today, however, not because
of your completed project but because of the order that restricted your inquiry."
74. See 298 So. 2d at 385-86.
75. The House Judiciary Committee has drafted a proposed "Grand Jury Amendment."
FLA. CONsT. art. V, §21, which reads:
"Duty of court to instruct grand jury.-When requested, the court shall adiise the
grand jury about its legal duties. In its original charge or thereafter the court shall
not restrict an investigation of any matter into which the grand jury is by law entitled
to inquire." Proposed Creation of FLA. CONsT. art. V, §21, by House Comm. on Judiciary,
No. 186-14-9-4 (Preliminary Draft). See FLA. STAT. §904.18 (1973).
Another proposal would amend FLA. CONsT. art. V, §2(a) to allow the legislature to
repeal or amend supreme court rules by a majority vote, see note 30 supra. Proposed
Amendment to FLA. CONsT. art. V, §2(a), by House Comm. on Judiciary, No. 186-14-9-4
(Preliminary Draft).
76. For suggestions, see ABA CoMI. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADNnNISTRATiON, COURT
ORGANIZATION

§1.33, at 69-73

(Tent. Draft 1973).
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